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TAXATION OF EASEMENTS.
N THE case of Lever v. Grant,' the supreme court passed inci-
dentally upon the effect of a tax deed on an easement ap-
purtenant to the estate on which the delinquent taxes had
been levied. From the facts in that case it appears that in 1884 the
owner of a parcel of land in the city of Detroit, bounded on the west
by Woodward avenue, platted the same. The plat shows a street
on the north side extending from Woodward avenue east thirty feet
wide, one-half the width of an ordinary street. This street was
named Custer Avenue. The next year, 1885, other owners platted a
parcel of land adjoining Custer avenue on the north. Upon this plat
appears a strip of land the same width as Custer avenue and bord-
ering it on the north marked "Private way." In the dedication of
this plat, the owners, after dedicating to the public the streets and
alleys appearing thereon, add: "excepting the north 3o feet of
Custer avenue, which we reserve as a private right of way." North
of Custer avenue and parallel therewith is Bethune avenue. The
land between the "private way" and Bethune avenue was divided
into lots, three of which front Woodward avenue and extend east
and west and the others extend north and south from the "private
way" to Bethune avenue. Grant, the defendant, purchased the lot
fronting Woodward avenue and adjoining the "private way." In
189o, this private way was assessed for city taxes, and Grant upon
the sale therefor, obtained a lease from the city of Detroit for 99
years. In 1894 the defendant obtained from the owners, the pro-
prietors of the plat, the fee of so much of the private way as ex-
tended along the side of his lot, and he enclosed the same.
Prior to 189o the plaintiff purchased from the owners lot 3oo,
1 x39 Mich. 273.
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the first lot east of defendant's lot, and when the defendant enclosed
the private way he filed- a bill to compel him to remove his fence.
The first question presented by these facts is this; the complainant
having purchased from the proprietors his lot, what easement if any
has that lot in the private way upon which it abuts? It was
contended on his part that there was appurtenant to that lot a right
of way over the strip to Custer avenue and also along the way to
Woodward avenue. The defendant contended that this strip having
been excepted in the dedication, the fee was retained by the propri-
etors and that the parties to whom lots were conveyed acquired no
right of way over or along the strip. The court commenting upon
these adverse claims say: "It is a reasonable supposition that there
was an intention to keep this strip of land with a view to its ultimate
condemnation for widening Custer avenue. If this is so, it is reason-
able to say- that they undertook to reserve this title to themselves,
so that they would receive the compensation when it should be con-
demned. If it was intended to convey the fee to the prospective
purchasers of the lots, the proprietors might as well have dedicated
the street to the public, for it is improbable that they reserved a right
of way for themselves merely, when a public street would do as well,
or that they intended to convey a fee to subsequent purchasers as
a gratuity. We are therefore of the opinion that this plat indicates
a reservation of the title in fee to the makers of the plat, and that
it was the intention of the owners to give the lot owners access to
Custer avenue over this land. It may be that its effect was to give
all purchasers of lots a right of way over the entire strip.. That,
however, is not an important question here, for it cannot affect the
result. The strip being reserved in fee by the owners of the land, it
wvas subject to taxation like other land. The plat shows that it was
,not a part of the respective lots. At the most it was an easement
appurtenant to them. If it be said that such appurtenance was in-
cluded in the assessment of a lot, it still left the -fee to be assessed to
the true owner and this was presumably done. Being sold for taxes
to the defendant, he acquired all of the. estate that was assessed, if
the proceedings were regular. They are not before us, and we do
not pass upon the effect of this tax deed, it being unnecessary to a
disposition of the cause."
We understand from this language that the court found as a
matter of law that the several lot owners under this dedication
acquired no right of way over this strip. It is true that the court say
"If it was intended to convey the fee to the intended purchasers."
The word "fee" must be due to a slip of the pen. What is meant
was, "if it was intended to convey a right of way, etc." since there
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.could be no contention that the fee to any portion of this strip passed
to the lot owners. This finding of fact and law disposed of the rights
,of the complainant. The court however adds, that it was the "in-
tention of the proprietors to give the lot owners access to Custer
avenue over this land" and perhaps to give all lot owners a right of
way over the entire strip. We assume that this is a hypothetical
finding, since it is wholly inconsistent with the previous finding., It
is to be read as saying that "if it was the intention to give lot owners
access over this strip to Custer avenue, etc., the matter is not im-
portant and cannot affect the result in this case," since the fee was
reserved and consequently assessable to the true owner and "being
sold for taxes to the defendant he acquired all the estate that was
.assessed, if the proceedings were regular. They are not before us
and we do not pass upon the effect of this tax deed." It will be
-noticed that what the court decided was that the fee, whether
subject to an easement or not, was assessable to the owner, and when
sold for taxes gave the purchaser title to the estate assessed, and
the court did not decide that in such a case that the estate assessed
was an estate in fee simple absolute and that the purchaser under the
tax sale took it relieved of the servitude, if one existed.
The first opinion dismisses the bill on the ground that before the
complainant had acquired title to lot 3oo the owner in fee of the
private way had conveyed to the defendant that portion which he
had enclosed. This decision was based upon an error of fact and by
stipulation of the parties it was admitted that the conveyance to the
defendant of a portion of the private way was subsequent to the
-conveyance of lot 3oo to complainant. Upon a motion for a rehearing
the court say: "It now becomes necessary to pass upon the effect of
the tax deed. The deed is prima facie evidence of the regularity, of
all the proceedings and we must therefore hold that the complainant
is not entitled to the relief asked in his bill."
We are with much reluctance compelled to conclude that the case
.pf Lever v. Grant is authority for the doctrine that where the servient
-estate is assessed to the owner of the fee, that upon the sale of the
lands for taxes the purchaser takes a title in fee simple absolute,
free from all servitudes whatever, at least all servitudes appurtenant
to private estates. It is however a conclusion merely, drawn from
what ,the court says and from what it omitted to say. There is no
,discussion and no direct decision of the question and the original
finding of law and fact made the decision of that question un-
-necessary.
Assuming that the court in Lever v. Grant decided that under the
facts in that case the proprietor of the lands platted, excepted from
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the dedication of the streets and- alleys, the fee of the strip marked
"private way" but that the purchaser of a lot described with reference
to the plat acquired a right of way appurtenant to such lot over and
along that "private way"; and that the court also decided that since
the fee to the private way was excepted, it was assessable and taxable
to the owners, and if sold for delinquent taxes so levied, the pur-
chaser would obtain an estate in fee simple relieved of the burden
of the servitude of such right of way, we propose to consider the
correctness of the conclusion at which the court arrived.
We think the court was in error for three reasons:
I. Upon principle, easements are appurtenant to the dominant
estate, belong to the dominant estate, are a part of that estate, and
must for purposes of taxation be so considered and treated.
2. By the great weight of authority all rights appurtenant to land
are taxable as a part of the land to which they are appurtenant.
3. Under the statutes of this state, for purposes of taxation, ease-
ments are declared to be a part of the dominant estate.
Let us consider the the first proposition, the character and nature
of a true easement. We omit all consideration of easements in gross.
An easement is a right without profit, created by grafit, prescription,
custom or law, appurtenant to an estate in one parcel of land called
the dominant estate which gives the owner of that estate the power
to exercise some dominion over another parcel of land called the
servient estate.2 It is designated an easement considered with refer-
ence to the dominant estate and a servitude as to the servient estate.
The character of the right is clearly indicated by the names- given
the two estates, the master, the slave; the dominant, the servient
estate. It is a right always imposed upon realty, never upon per-
sonalty or upon a person or individual. It is always appurtenant to
realty and never belongs to an individual as such. The owner or
occupant of the domihant estate, because he is the owner or occu-
pant and as incident to such ownership or occupancy, may exercise
the appurtenant right in connection with the use and enjoyment of
the dominant estate and not otherwise.
3
The easement is a part of the dominant estate and must, so long-
as it exists, remain a part of that estate. It can be 'released to the
servient estate but it cannot be transferred to another estate, or to
2 Washburn, Ease. 2; Goddard, Ease. 2; 3 Kent. Com. 452; Nellis v. Munson,
xo8 N. Y. 453; Ritger v. Parker, 8 Cush. 147; Momson v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35-,
Prince v. Keatie, 7o N. Y. 419; Hills v. Miller, 8 Paige 254; Big Mountain 
etc. Ap-
peal, 54 Pa. St. 361; Hewlins v. Shippam, ! Ban. & C. 221; Rowbotham 
v. Wilson,
8 Ellis & B. 123.
SAckroyd v. Smith, so C. B. 164.
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an individual. It passes with the dominant estate under the statute
of descent, or by devise or by grant. But the dominant estate cannot
be devised or granted and the easement excepted and if an effort is
made to except it, and force and effect are given to the exception it is
regarded and treated as in effect a release to the servient estate.
A recent decision of the supreme.court of Michigan sheds light
upon the nature of an easement.4 The complainant filed a bill pray-
ing that the defendant be enjoined from passing over complainant's
lands to the highway. It appeared that both parcels, that held by
defendant and that held by complainant, were purchased from the
government and conveyed in the same patent to the common grantor
of both parties. That the person who entered the lands conveyed
to complainant or his grantors his parcel and afterwards to the
defendant or his grantors, his parcel: that defendant's parcel was
landlocked and that there was no means of ingress or egress to the
highway from the parcel retained by the common grantor, except
over the parcel granted to defendant, at the time of the grant and
that such condition had continued ever since. The supreme court
held that the grantor reserved by implication a way of necessity ap-
purtenant to the lands retained. In other words, that there did not
pass to the grantee, an estate in fee simple absolute in the lands con-
veyed, with an unlimited right of user, but a fee simple, the vse of
which, was limited by the reserved right of the grantor to pass over
such land for the use and benefit of lands retained, and that the
servitude so impressed upon one estate and the easement made
appurtenant to the other, passed to the grantees of such estates,
without being mentioned or described in the deeds conveying said
lands. We do not quote the language of the decision, but state in
our own words the principle of law enunciated by the court, it
seems to us that it would follow, that the dominant estate for pur-
poses of taxation, possessed an easement which is a part of such
estate, and that the servient estate is burdened with a servitude and
that it is the fee so burdened that is taxed and passes upon a sale
and that such tax deed would not destroy the easement, a way of
necessity, over the servient estate, appurtenant to the dominant estate.
To hold that it would destroy the easement, would in effect deprive
the owner of the dominant estate of his property without due process
of law.
An easement is an interest in land. A perpetual easement appur-
tenant to an estate in fee is a freehold estate.5 . Courts will enforce
' Moore v. White, 16 D. I.. N., 95S decided Dec. 31, 1909.
3 Tinker v. Forbes, x36 I. 221.
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a parol contract to convey an easement and decree specific perform-
ance when, under like circumstances, they would decree specific
performance of the contract, if it had been for the conveyance of
the land itself.6
We are not aware that the courts have ever made any distinction
between an easement created by grant and one created by law. ror
instance the upper riparian owner has a right of drainage through a
natural water course over a lower tenement. But if there is no
natural water course and the owner of the lower tenement by grant
gives the upper tenement a right of drainage through an artificial
water course to the same extent as though it were a natural water
course, the acquired right of drainage is precisely the same as though
it were naturally incident to the dominant estate. Incidentally we
-might suggest that we have never discovered any intimation made
by a member of any court or bar, that the sale of a lower tenement
for taxes would deprive the owner of an upper tenement of the right
of drainage through a natural water course. Or, indeed, that if an
upper riparian owner had acquired, by grant, or prescription, the,
right to pollute the waters of a natural stream, that the sale for taxes
of a lower parcel through which such stream flowed would have the
effect to destroy that right.
Perhaps we have made it sfifficiently clear that an easement is a
part of the dominant estate to which it is appurtenant. If so we beg
pardon for prolonging this part of the discussion. Assume that A
is the owner of adjoining lots i and 2, each 66 x 132, and extending
east and west. A conveys to B the north lot, No. 2 and six feet off
the north part of lot i, by metes and bounds, a strip of land 72 x 132.
It goes without saying that if B records his deed, A must be assessed
upon a lot 6o x 132 and B upon one 72 x 132 and that if B was prop-
,erly assessed and A was assessed for all of lot one and it was sold
for taxes so assessed, the purchaser would acquire no title to the
north six feet belonging to B and assessed to him. Suppose in the
case we have assumed A conveys to B, lot 2 and also a right of way
in fee for all purposes over the north six feet of lot i, making the
way appurtenant to lot 2 and that such deed is recorded. It is the
duty of the assessor to assess each lot with reference to its value.
The right of way has increased the value of lot 2 and diminished
the value of lot i. In the absence of proof the court must assume
that the assessor has performed his duty. By what process of rea-
soning can it be maintained that if A fails to pay the taxes assessed
upon lot one .the tax purchaser will have acquired a .title free from
G Wynn v. Garland, x9 Ark. 23; Parker v. Nightengale, 6 Allen 341.
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the right of way? Again suppose in the case assumed A conveys to
B lot 2, and by proper words of reservation and grant the south six
feet of lot 2 and the north six feet of lot i constitute an alley in fee
for the perpetual use of lots i and 2. Now each lot is, as to the
other, both a dominant and a servient estate, since each has a right
of way over six feet of the other lot and has given the other lot a
right of way over a like strip. Both lots are assessed and taxed.
The taxes on one are paid. The other is sold for taxes. What are
the rights of the tax purchaser as to the owner of the other lot?
Can he maintain that by virtue of his tax deed he has acquired the
right to use as an alley six feet on the other lot and at the same time
insist that by virtue of the same deed he can prevent the other lot
owner from using as an alley six feet on the lot sold for taxes?
Suppose in the case assumed, that both lots are of like value, that the
improvements on each are the same, that the alley is of the same
advantage to each, it follows that the same amount of tax will be
levied upon each. Let us assume that one owner, in the perform-
ance of the duty he owes the state, pays the taxes levied upon his lot
and the other shirks his public obligations and his lot is sold for the
taxes he should have paid. By what process of reasoning can it
be made to appear that the just citizen has lost a valuable right
appurtenant to his lot and the unjust citizen through his-default has
given another a greater estate in his lot than he himself possessed?,
There is another course of reasoning which brings us to the same
conclusion. No man can be deprived of his property without due
process of law: and while the distinction in some cases between taxa-
tion and confiscation is of no practical advantage to the victim, it is
always of tremendous theoretical importance to the community of
sufferers. The right of the state to levy taxes and the right of the
citizen to pay the taxes so levied are reciprocal. The citizen by sub-
mitting to the burden imposed can save his property. He also has
the right to protect an interest which he may have in the property
of another which has been taxed, by himself paying the taxes. In
such a case if the interest is in the nature of a lien, he is permitted
to add the amount paid to the lien and thus recover it back froim the
land. Payment of taxes by a mortgagee is a familiar illustration of
this principle. If the owner of a separate interest in land finds that
such interest has been taxed in connection with other interests he
may as a rule pay his proportion of the tax and thus protect his
interest. When that cannot be done, a court of equity will ascertain
the amount which he ought to pay and protect him if he has been
compelled to pay a greater sum. Bearing these general principles
in mind, how is the owner of the dominant estate to protect the ease-
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ment appurtenant to that estate? Let us assume that the owner of
a mill site has acquired by deed valuable rights of flowage which
have increased the value of his water power $io,ooo and he has been
assessed properly for that sum. Let us assume that among others
who have granted this right of flowage is A who owns 16o acres of
land and that he has granted the right to flow forty acres of it. A is
assessed for i6o acres, does not pay his taxes and the mill owner
goes to the tax collector and offers to pay his proportion of the taxes,
the amount levied upon his right of flowage. What reply would he
receive? At least this, "I have no means of knowing what your pro-
portion is; if you wish to pay the entire tax, I will receive it and give
you the proper receipt." But as a matter of fact no part of the tax
is levied upon the easement, the right of flowage, appurtenant to the
dominant estate. If in fixing the value of the servient estate, the
servitude it bears is taken into account, its value is diminished. If
it is not taken into account and the tax is levied upon the value of the
fee simple, without reference to the interest which is appurtenant to
the dominant estate, the owner of the servienti1estate is taxed upon
an illegal basis of valuation. The right of flowage which he has con-
veyed in fee to the mill owner has diminished the value of his estate
in fee in the lands flowed. If the value of this right of flowage has
been taxed to the mill owner whose property has been enhanced in
value by such appurtenant right he may not be required, lawfully or
equitably to pay a second tax, covering the same interest, through
the fault of the assessor in determining the value of the servient
estate.
It would seem therefore upon principle that since an easement is
an incorporal hereditament appurtenant to the dominant estate which
increases the value of the dominant estate, it must be taxed as a part
,of the dominant estate: that the servient estate must be'taxed as be-
ing subject to a servitude which diminishes its value and consequent-
ly that when the servient estate is sold for taxes, the estate taxed
'passes to the purchaser, which is the fee subject to a servitude.
When we come to consider our second proposition, we find few
adjudicated cases and many of them turn upon the construction of
local statutes. We shall not consider any except those which treat
the question under the common law.
The city of Fall River levied a tax upon the Watuppa Reservoir
Company, which the county commissioners set aside, and thereupon
the city petitioned the court for a writ of certiorari to quash the
abatement proceedings. Justice Ames, who heard the petition, re-
served the case for the supreme court and the decision of that court
is reported in 125 Mass. 567. It appears that the Reservoir Company
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did not own the dam or any of the land covered by their pond. The
-only interest the company had in any land was a right of flowage.
The court say that that right is merely an easement in land which
cannot be taxed independently. It forms part of the water power
-which is taxed in connection with the mills as enhancing their value.
We have no clear statement of the facts. How the "mills" were con-
nected with the Reservoir Company is not stated. It appears how-
ever that in some way the easement of flowage. was for their benefit
and therefore the easement must be taxed in connection with the
mills, as constituting a part of the dominant estate.
The supreme court of Iowi holds that the lands of a water com-
pany shall include buildings, engines, pumps, mains, pipes, -reservoirs,
and that the same shall be assessed as an entirety.
7
There is a class of easements the beneficial use and enjoyment of
which require in the first instance an expenditure of labor and
material. For example the easement that a gas or water company
has to use the servient estate for the transmission of gas or water
cannot be enjoyed u.til proper pipes are laid. The company must
in the first instance expend very considerable sums before the ease-
ment can be beneficially enjoyed. The value of the gas plant or
water works is made up very largely of the cost of laying pipes and
making connections with the residences of consumers. The question
has been frequently before the courts in regard to the nature of this
property. It is not free from difficulty. The easement gives the
owner of the dominant estate no interest in the corpus of the servi-
ent esfate. It is merely an incorporeal right to use the servient estate
for a certain purpose. That right of use, in any case, may require
the expenditure of labor and material. A right of way may neces-
sitate the construction of a road and bridges. In such a case the
grant of the way carries with it the right to construct and maintain
a roadway. But since the easement gave the owner of the dominant
estate no right to any portion of the servient estate, it is difficult to
,conceive how by doing simply what the circumstances require to be
done to enjoy the grant, he can acquire any such interest. A gas
company for instance is given an easement in streets, alleys and pri-
vate lands to conduct gas from its works to the consumer: in other
words to lay gas mains and pipes. It has no interest in the soil in
-which they are placed. They are placed in the ground for the sole
purpose of enabling the company to use and enjoy its easement.
They are valuable for that purpose and in that connection and for no
other purpose and in no other connection. If the use of gas should be
I Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board etc. 84 Iowa 407, rS I,. R. A. 296, note.
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superseded by the use of electricity, the entire value of the gas mains
and under ground pipes would be destroyed. Let us assume that in
a given case a gas company has expended $ioo,ooo in the construc-
tion of gas mains and pipes and that the use and enjoymeit of the
easement, made possible only by such expenditure, is of that value at
least: how is the property of the company to be assessed? Is that
sum of $Iooooo to be regarded as the value of the easement, or the
value of iron pipes in situ? It must be born in mind that the cost of
constructing the mains and pipes is made up in part, not an incon-
'siderable part, by the cost of the labor of placing them in the ground.
Is the cost of the labor to be added to the cost of the material in
determining their assessable value? If the pipes are to be regarded
as property separate and apart from the easement, which gives them
their sole value, are they to be regarded as real or personal property ?
The case of The Monroe Water Co. v. The.Township of Frenwh-
town, 98 Mich. 4O, throws some light upon this question. The
plaintiff was a corporation, incorporated under the laws of Michigan-
Under the statute it had a right to acquire by grant or condemnation,
lands to enable it to lay pipes for the purpose of supplying the city
and inhabitants of Monroe with water, taken from Lake Erie. It
owned one acre of land, in the defendant township, upon which was
erected a building, containing an engine, pumps and other suitable
machinery. Pipes extended from those works to the lake and to the
City of Monroe. The supervisor of the defendant township, assessed
the real estate of the corporation at $8,ooo. The board of review
raised this amount to $Ioooo and they added to the roll the value of
the pipes as personalty $3oooo. The plaintiff paid the taxes assessed
upon the $3o,ooo under protest and this suit was brought to recover
the amount so paid.
It appears that there was no evidence that the pipes were not laid
in lands belonging to the plaintiff. It is very evident however that
they were not. It owned the one acre upon which its works were
located and had acquired a right to lay its pipes, in highways, streets-
and through private grounds in which it had acquired an easement
appurtenant to the acre. Commenting upon the contention that the
pipes were personal property, the court says: "We think that it
cannot be said that, even if these pipes are to be regarded as person-
alty, they would be assessable as such to the owner outside of his
place of residence. We do not place the decision of this case, how-
ever, upon the ground that these pipes can in any sense be said to be
personalty, but are satisfied that the ground, building and machinery,
together with these pipes, which are necessary appurtenances to the
building under the showing made, are a part of the realty. It is
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admitted by defendant that this might be true if the pipes were laid
wholly upon plaintiff's land: but, as we have said, there is no show-1
ing that they were laid anywhere else than upon the land of the
plaintiff, and lands which the plaintiff has a right to own and control
under the statute authorizing its incorporation, and under which
water companies are empowered to take lands by purchase or by
condemnation. How. Stat. Secs. 3115, 3117." If as the court say
the "ground, building and machinery, together with these pipes
which are necessary appurtenances to the building, under the show-
ing made, are a part of the realty" they should have been so assessed
by the supervisor. It follows, of course, that if the assessment had
been so made and some of the lands in which the corporation had
acquired a right to lay pipes, an easement appurtenant to their works,
had been assessed and sold for delinquent taxes the sale would not
have destroyed the easement.
A somewhat similar question was presented in the case of the
Newzaygo Cement Co. v. Sheridan" Township.8  Several riparian
owners on Lake Fremont conveyed to the plaintiff all their land
covered by the water of the lake. The-deeds recited: "It being the
intention of the parties of the first part to convey all their rights to
the water and the soil under the water in Freemont Lake belonging
and appurtenant to said above described premises." It will be ob-
served that the grant conveyed to the grantee all the grantor's water
rights and the soil under the water. That and nothing more. The su-
pervisor after these conveyances described the grantors' lands as be-
fore, except he added to the description "excepting riparian rights."
The grantee's lands were described as "that part of the following de-
scribed premises lying in Fremont Lake, including all the riparian
rights along and appurtenant to said premises." The lands and ri-
parian rights of the plaintiff were valued at $5,ooo upon which the
taxes levied were $77.5o. The taxes levied upon the grantor's lands
without riparian rights were $80-.73. From this it would appear that
the riparian rights constituted before the sale nearly one-half of the
value of the grantor's lands. The taxes levied were paid by the cor-
poration under protest and suit was brought to recover them from
the township. Plaintiff in error contended that there had been an
effort made to sever the riparian rights and convey them as such.
The court held that there had been no such effort, but that the soil
beneath the waters had been conveyed and that the riparian right.-
were appurtenant thereto and had been properly assessed.
The holdings of the courts upon this question have not been uni-
3 137 Mich. 475.
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form. Rhode Island has decided that gas gipes laid in streets are
real estate, while the courts of New York have held that they are
not.9
Under an Act of Parliament providing for the support of the poor,
rates are to be levied upon all occupants of lands. In interpreting
-and enforcing this statute the English courts hold that a gas or waterz
-company whose works are situated in one parish but which by means
of mains and pipes supplies water or gas to the inhabitants of several
parishes is, for the payment of poor rates, an occupant of the land
through which its pipes extend, but that the amount of the tax pay-
able in any particular parish is to be ascertained and apportioned with
xeference to the profits of its business in that parish.30
This rule is adopted evidently to secure a just apportionment of
the poor rates among the several parishes, for the court holds that
the company's occupancy of lands with their mains and pipes does
not make them liable for a "land tax" -as having "lan'd or heredita-
And now we come to a consideration of the Michigan statute upon
this subject. The statute which defines real estate for the purposes
-of taxation, Sec. 3825, C. L. 1897, declares: "For the purpose of
taxation, real property shall include all lands within the state, and all
buildings and fixtures thereon and appurtenances thereto, except
such as are expressly exempted by law."
There can be no controversy over the proposition that a true
easement is an incorporeal hereditament appurtenant to land and
,consequently that under this provision of the statute it must be
treated, considered, valued and assessed as belonging to the land to
-which it is appurtenant.
The statute provides that all lands for purposes of taxation shall be
-assessed at their "cash value" and the statute gives express directions
for ascertaining such cash value. Sec. 3850 C. L. 1897 provides:
"The words 'cash value' wherever used in this act, shall be held to
.-mean the usual selling price, at the place where the property to which
the term is applied shall be at the time of assessment, being the price
-which could be obtained therefor at private sale and not at forced
or auction sale. In determining the value the assessor shall also con-
-sider the advantages and disadvantages of the location, quality of
!soil, quantity and value of standing timber, water power and priv-
0 Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15; People v. Brooklyn Assessors, 39
q. Y. 81.10 
Rex v. Brighton Gas Co. etc., 5 B. & C. 466; Regina v. Cambridge Gas Co.,
8 Ad. & El. 73; Rex v. Rochdale Water Works, i Maule & S. 634.
21 Chelsea Water Works v. Bowley, 17 Q .B. 358; Rex v. Bath, 14 East 6og.
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ileges, mines, minerals, quarries or other valuable deposits, known to
be available therein and their value."
"The value of a water power depends primarily upon the head to
which the water may rightfully be raised. It is of no consequence
in determining that value whether the mill owner is the owner in fee
of the land flowed, or is the owner in fee of an easement of flowage.
The term "privileges" would include such easement of flowage, but
its meaning is far broader than that, and includes any right. or power
appurtenant to land, such as easements and profits a prendre of every
name and description.
Courts will presume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that
assessing officers have followed, in making assessments, these plain
and explicit provisions of the statute, and must conclude therefore,
that taxes levied upon the servient estate are not levied upon an
.estate in fee simple absolute, but upon the fee burdened with a servi-
tude, and when lands so assessed are sold for delinquent taxes, it is.
the estate assessed and taxed that passes to the purchaser, the fee
burdened with the servitude. It is true that a tax title is a new,
original and independent source of title. But the title is confined to
the estate taxed and passes no interest in another and greater estate-
We do not think that the courts should hold that at the common
law, much less under the Michigan statutes, that where a servient
estate is sold for delinquent taxes the effect of such a sale is to
deprive a dominant estate of an easement therein.
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UNIVERSITY OV MICHIGAN.
